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Punitive Damages:
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note analyzes the authority of commercial arbitrators to award
punitive damages. The Note first discusses the use of arbitration in
commercial disputes. The Note then examines the facts of Raytheon Co.
v. Automated Business Systems,1 a case in which the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed an arbitration award of punitive damages in a
commercial dispute. The Note then looks at the application of the Federal
Arbitration Act to commercial arbitration. Finally, the Note analyzes
three different approaches the courts have taken in ieviewing punitive
damage awards in commercial arbitration, 'and concludes that commercial
arbitrators will likely have great discretion to award punitive damages in
the future.
II. ARBITRATION OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTEs
Arbitratidn has provided an efficient means to resolve commercial
disputes in the United States.2 Arbitration offers the advantages of speed,
economy, expertise of the arbitrator, privacy, and a degree of*
effectiveness.3  Speed is always of the essence in dispute "resolution,
especially for the party seeking relief. The "time" element of arbitration'
is also significant because of court congestion. In terms of economy,
arbitration is often less costly than litigation. Arbitration typically reduces
legal fees and the time that the individual parties themselves must devote
to the dispute. The expertise of the arbitrator can reduce both the length
and cost of the dispute as well as provide confidence that a fair and just
resolution of the dispute will be reached. The private atmosphere of
arbitration provides a climate that is favorable to continued business
relations and avoids adverse publicity. On the downside, arbitration poses
a degree of unpredictability in the arbitrator's decision due to the lack of
the use of precedent and written opinion.4
Commercial arbitration provides the business community with a
means to self-regulate disputes. Although the use of commercial
arbitration has not expanded in the United States to the extent that it has
in Europe, commercial arbitration has nevertheless experienced
1. 882 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1989).
2. MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (1965).
3. Id. at 8-11.
4. Id. at 14.
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tremendous growth and has become something of an institution in the
United States.!
Arbitration has not replaced formal court litigation, but does provide
an efficient supplement to the judiciary system for parties who voluntarily
submit their disputes to binding arbitration.6 Due to the expertise of
arbitrators on the subject matter of the particular dispute, judges have
recently expressed through their opinions a greater willingness to defer to
the judgment of arbitrators.
Arbitration is appropriate in a number of commercial disputes.
Issues of fact and unclear wording in a contract are the most common
areas of dispute.7 In these areas, arbitration provides a more efficient
means of dispute resolution because of the arbitrator's special knowledge
of the subject matter of the commercial transaction.
*For this reason, judges in recent years have tended to limit their
review of commercial arbitration decisions to cases of abuse of
discretion! However, commentators have questioned whether the
judiciary should grant arbitrators such discretion over the punitive
damages portion of such an award. 9 Punitive damages provide a civil
source of public retribution and are designed to punish the wrongdoer and
to deter the wrongdoer and others from repeating the same offense.10
Punitive damages also provide an incentive to wronged parties to pursue
causes of action where tangible harm and resulting damages are nominal
but where the defendant's behavior subjects society to substantial risk."
III. RAYTHEON Co. v. AUTOMATED BusiNEss SYSTMS -
THE FACTS
In 1978, Lexitron, a subsidiary of Raytheon Company, entered into
a contract with Automated Business Systems for the distribution of word
processing equipment. 2  The contract contained a general arbitration
clause which provided in pertinent part: "[a]ll disputes arising in
5. Id. at 2. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953, 954 (1986); see Peter F. Gazada,
Comment, Arbitration: Making Court-Annexed Arbitration Attractive in Tesas, 16 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 409, 411 (1985).
6. DOMKE. supra note 2, at 2.
7. DOMKE, supra note 2, at 3.
8. DOMKE, supra note 2, at 5.
9. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL RULES, Rule 3 (Feb. 1, 1984).
10. Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 955.
11. Hon. Donald D. Alsop & David F. Herr, Punitive Damages in Minnesota Products
Liability Cases: A Judicial Perspective, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 319 (1985).
12. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1989).
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connection with the Agreement shall be settled by arbitration . .
conducted according to the rules of the American Arbitration
Association."
In 1986, Automated filed a demand for-arbitration against Raytheon,
alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, violation of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, fraud, deceit, and conspiracy.1 4 In addition to requesting
compensatory and consequential damages, Automated sought punitive
damages on the alleged tort violations.'5
After arbitration hearings, a majority of the panel of three
arbitrators awarded damages to Automated in the following amounts:
$408,000 in compensatory damages, $121,000 in attorneys' fees, $47,000
in expenses, and $250,000 in punitive damages. 6
Raytheon filed suit in federal court to vacate the award, alleging,
inter alia, that the arbitration panel had no authority to award punitive.
damages. 17  Raytheon, relying primarily on case law involving labor
arbitration, argued that arbitrators must have explicit contractual authority
im order to award punitive damages."
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Raytheon, thus faced the issue
of whether commercial arbitrators, absent an express provision to the
contrary, have the authority to award punitive damages.
IV. FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT
A number of federal court rulings have held that arbitrators have the
right to award punitive damages under the Federal Arbitration Act, -which
provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,





17. Id. at 6.
18. Id. at 10.
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save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract. 19
A significant issue involved in all of these cases is the power of
courts to vacate arbitration awards. Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration
Act provides that an arbitration award may be vacated:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.2
Courts have generally held that arbitration awards enforcing an
illegal agreement or an agreement violative of public policy should be
vacated. 21 However, courts remain split over issues such as what is the
best public policy to follow. For instance, New York courts have held
that determination of punitive damages is best left to the judiciary, thereby
restricting an arbitrator's authority."
As a general rule, any doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable.
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. In Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,3 the United States Supreme Court
held that the Federal Arbitration Act should be construed broadly. The
Court thus overruled common law precedent in holding that a claim of
fraud in the inducement of a contract was arbitrable under the Federal
Arbitration Act where the contract, a consulting agreement, called for
arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the
consulting agreement], or breach thereof. "24 The Court based its holding
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
20. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
21. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
22. Id. at 796.
23. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
24. Id. at 403.
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on section 3 of the Federal Aibitration Act,2s which requires a federal
court in which a suit is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration
under the contract to stay the action pending arbitration.
The Raytheon-Automated agreement contained a general arbitration
clause, which provided that "all disputes" would be settled through
arbitration.' However, the clause did not specifically address the issue of
punitive damages.' The agreement required that arbitration be conducted
according to the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).2
AAA Rule 42 states that arbitrators may grant any relief which is just and
equitable within the terms of the agreement.2 The Raytheon court thus
had to determine whether the parties intended to include the power to
award punitive damages within the terms of the agreement when the
parties agreed to "settle" through arbitration all disputes arising under the
contract and to authorize the arbitrator to grant any just and equitable
relief. The court in Raytheon held that the plain language of the
arbitration clause was sufficiently broad to permit an award of punitive
damages. 30
A number of decisions, including a decision by the First Circuit3'
(the same circuit court that decided Raytheon), have required explicit
contractual authority before arbitrators can award punitive damages.3' In
a dispute involving a collective bargaining agreement, the First Circuit
held that where the "parties to a collective bargaining agreement have
provided for arbitration as the final and binding method for settling
grievances the arbitration award is normally non-reviewable by a court. "3
However, the court further held that if the punitive damages award did
not "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement," then the
arbitration *panel has exceeded its authority and the award must be
vacated.3
The Seventh Circuit has upheld an arbitration award based on'a
collective bargaining agreement so long as the arbitration panel attempts to
25. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
26. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1989).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION App. VII at 53 (Gabriel M.
Wilner rev. ed. 1990) (Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association).
30. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 12 (Ist Cir. 1989).
31. Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210,
214 (1st Cir. 1982).
32. Id.; Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159,
1164 (7th Cir. 1984), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
33. Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210,
211 (quoting Bettencourt v. Boston Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1048 (Ist Cir. 1977)).
34. Id. at 214.
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interpret the collective bargaining agreement itself rather than to apply the
arbitrators' own ideas of right and wrong s The court went on to hold
that it could only vacate a remedy imposed by a labor arbitration panel
where the court determined that the arbitrators' remedy was clearly not
within the contemplation of the parties and was thus not authorized by the
collective bargaining agreement.3
The First Circuit distinguished these decisions vacating awards of
punitive damages, which were based on labor arbitration, from Raytheon,
which involved commercial arbitration. 7 The court saw labor arbitration
as part of an integral process of ongoing dispute resolution Commercial
arbitration is designed as a means of permanent dispute resolution, with
the primary objectives of saving both time and money. 9 Unlike labor
arbitration, commercial arbitration is generally not designed to facilitate an
ongoing process. 40 The court thus discarded any reliance by plaintiff -
Raytheon on labor arbitration case law.
V. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARDS IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Courts in general have taken three different approaches to the issue
of punitive damage awards in commercial arbitration.
A. Punitive Damages are Per Se Illegal
First, some courts have held that arbitrators can never award
punitive damages.41 The First Circuit in Raytheon cites Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart Inc. ,,- a 1976 New York state court case, as the lead case in which
New York's highest court held that, as a matter of state law, arbitrators
can never award punitive damages. Garrity directly addressed the issue
35. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162-63
(7th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 1164.
37. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1989).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 10.
41. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Publishers'
Ass'n of N.Y. City v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of N.Y. and Vicinity, 114
N.Y.S.2d 401, 404-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952). See aLso Anderson v. Nichols, 359 S.E.2d
117, 121, n. 1 (W.Va. 1987); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assoc., 698 P.2d 880, 882 (N.M. 1985).
42. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
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of whether arbitrators in general have the power to award punitive
damages.' Garrity did not limit its holding to commercial arbitrators.
Author Joan Garrity had sued 'her publisher for fraud. The
publishing contract provided for arbitration of all disputes. The
arbitration panel awarded Garrity full compensatory damages in addition
to $7,500 in punitive damages. Both the trial court and lower appellate
court affirmed the award of punitive damages by the commercial
arbitrators.
The New York Court of Appeals vacated the punitive damages
award." The court held that although arbitrators are generally free to
fashion a remedy commensurate with the wrong, arbitrators have no
power to award punitive damages, even if expressly agreed upon by the
parties. The court based its holding almost solely on -public policy,"M
stating that arbitrators' broad powers are limited to a compensatory
remedy measured by the harm caused. The Garrity court viewed punitive
'damages as a social exemplary "remedy," and, as such, punishable only
by the state and not by private individuals acting through the courts.'
Punitive damages are a form of retribution whereby the defendant has
committed' a moral wrong, whereas compensatory damages provide a
means of relief to an injured party. Punitive damages are awarded as a
means of deterring either the same defendant (specific deterrence) or
others (general deterrence) from committing the same act. Punitive
damages are thus the civil form of criminal sanctions.
Judge Breitel, writing for the majority in Garrity, also noted the
absence of standards for judicial oversight of arbitrators' awards. 7 When
reviewing arbitration awards, courts generally limit their review to three
'factors: (1) whether the award is authorized by the contract, (2) whether
the proceeding is complete and final on its face, and (3) whether the
proceeding was. fairly conducted. 0  According to Judge Breitel, these
three factors provide an adequate means of reviewing awards of
compensatory damages because arbitrators must make an objective
determination of actual damages based upon the injury caused.
Punitive damages, in contrast, involve subjective determinations
based on the conduct of the defendaht, not the harm caused by such
conduct. As such, the majority of the New York Court of Appeals
expressed its concern for the potential for manipulation of the arbitrators
43. Id. at 794.
44. Id.
45. Id. at'795.
46. Id. at 796.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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by the party in the superior bargaining position.' The majority concluded
that such potential for abuse would reduce confidence in the arbitration
process.-
The dissent in Garrity also focused on public policy, citing the
importance of arbitration in the process of dispute resolution.51  The
dissent proposed that arbitrators be permitted, to grant remedies as they
see fit, and to be bound only by the limits of justice and rationality. The
dissent urged that since an award of $7,500 in punitive damages was
neither irrational nor unjust, the arbitration award should be upheld.
Although a number of federal court rulings in recent years have
held that arbitrators have the right to award punitive damages under the
Federal Arbitration Act, a district court from the Southern District of New
York held that state law controls the issue of whether arbitrators have the
authority to award punitive damages.2 .The case was brought by an
employee who sued his former employer, a securities corporation and
member of the New York Stock Exchange. The court held that state
substantive law which prevents arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages does not conflict with any provision of the Federal Arbitration
Act. The court thus adopted the Garrity rule in favoring the state
substantive law.
B. Punitive Damages Require an Express Agreement by the Parties
Some courts have held that arbitrators have no authority to award
punitive damages absent an express agreement by the parties. The Ohio
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether arbitrators had the
power to award punitive damages in contractual disputes in State Farm
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Blevins.s3
Ohio Revised Code section 2711.10 sets the limits by which Ohio
courts may review an award of arbitration. It provides:
In any of the following cases, the court of common
pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration if:
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 799-800 (Gabrielli, I., dissenting).
52. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, No. 90 Civ. 1792 (PKL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11024 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1990).
53. 551 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio 1990).
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(D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.'
State Farm, the defendant, alleged that the arbitration panel
exceeded their authority by awarding punitive damages.M The Ohio
Supreme Court thus had to examine the parties' contract, the insurance
policy, to determine whether the arbitrators had the power to award
punitive damages.
The court looked at the construction of the specific contractual
provisions of the insurance policy. The plaintiff had sued to recover on
an automobile liability insurance policy issued by the defendant. The
policy stated: "We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is
legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor
vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident arising out of the
operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle. "S6 The
policy also contained an arbitration clause which did not address the issue
of punitive damages. In holding that an arbitrator's powers are set by the
agreement from which the arbitrator draws authority, the court refused to
award punitive damages absent express language in the contract granting
such authority.
Justice Brown, writing for the majority, stated that "the purpose of
punitive damages is to punish the offending party and make the offender
an example to others so that they might be deterred from similar
conduct," and that Ohio disfavors insurance against punitive damages
resulting from the insured's own tortsY The majority was hesitant to
compel the insurer to unwittingly provide coverage for punitive damages.
The Ohio Supreme Court thus held that in the absence of specific
contractual language, coverage for punitive or exemplary damages will not
be presumed under a provision for uninsured motorist coverage. 5
With regard to the specific insurance policy at issue, the majority
focused on the provision of the policy which promised to pay damages
"for bodily injury. "s' Because the majority recognized that this provision
limited the insurer's liability to compensatory damages, the court found
that the insurer did not contract to insure against punitive damages. The
54. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (Baldwin 1990).
55. Id. at 166.
56. Id. at 165.
57. Id. at 168.
58. Id. at 169.
59. Id.
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court thus held that the arbitrators exceeded their authority when they
awarded punitive damages.
The First Circuit in Raytheon similarly looked at the construction of
the contractual provision? ° However, the court, finding the words "[a]ll
disputes" to be very broad, upheld the award of punitive damages by the
arbitrator.
C. Arbitrators Have Discretion to Award Punitive Damages
Some courts have upheld punitive damage awards absent specific
contractual provisions addressing the issue. In Bonar v. Dean Witter
Reynolds,6' the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that, by adopting
the rules of the American Arbitration Association, the contract authorized
the arbitrators to award punitive damages. The court's reasoning was
based on an arbitration clause which did not address the issue of punitive
damages. An arbitration panel awarded punitive as well as compensatory
damages to investors involved in a dispute with Dean Witter Reynolds, a
securities broker. Dean Witter sued to vacate the arbitrator's award.
Similarly to Blevins and Raytheon, the Eleventh Circuit focused on
the language of the agreement to determine whether the punitive damages
award was justified. The arbitration clause of the agreement between
Dean Witter and Bonar provided:
Any controversy between [Dean Witter] and [the
Bonars] arising out of or relating to this contract or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in
accordance with the rules, then obtaining, of either the
Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York, or the American Arbitration
Association, or the Board of Arbitration of the New
York Stock Exchange, as the [Bonars] may elect ....
Any arbitration hereunder shall be before at least three
arbitrators and the award of the arbitrators, or a
majority of them, shall be final, and judgment upon the
award rendered may be entered in any court, state or
federal, having jurisdiction.6
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 42, the same rule cited in
Raytheon, provides that the arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
which he deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement
60. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1989).
61. 835 F.2d 1378 (1 Ith Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 1386.
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of the parties. 3 As in Raytheon, the agreement in Bonar appeared to be
sufficiently broad to permit the arbitrators to award punitive damages.
However, another section of the agreement between the Bonars and
Dean Witter provided that "lt]his agreement and its enforcement shall be
governed by the laws of the State of New York.. . ."" Under Garrity,o
arbitrators acting pursuant to the law of New York may not award
punitive damages. The obvious dilemma facing the Eleventh Circuit was
whether to apply AAA Rule 42, which would permit the punitive damages
award, or to apply the law of the state of New York, which flatly
prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.
The Eleventh Circuit cited Willoughby Roofing and Supply Co. v.
Kajima International, Inc.," for the proposition that a choice of law
provision in a contract does not, by itself, prevent arbitrators from
awarding punitive damages.
"Although the parties to a contract can agree that a
certain state's law will govern the resolution of issues
submitted to arbitration (i.e., plaintiffs entitlement to
punitive damages, assuming [a certain state's
substantive] law applies), federal law governs the
categories of claims subject to arbitration" and "the
resolution of issues concerning the arbitration
provision's interpretation, construction, validity,
revocability, and enforceability. '
Accordingly, the choice of law provision in the contract did not deprive
the arbitrators of their authority to award punitive damages."
In Willoughby, the district court also referred to strong federal
policies supporting arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act in
upholding the arbitral award of punitive damages. 69 The contract at issue
in Bonar evidenced a transaction in interstate commerce, and was
therefore subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. 70 The contract agreement
was therefore subject to the broad authority provided by AAA Rule 42.7'
63. DoMKE, supra note 29, App. VII at 43.
64. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 835 F.2d 1378, 1386 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
65. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
66. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 359 (quoting Willis v. Shearson/American Express, 569 F. Supp. 821, 823-
24 (M.D. N.C. 1983)).
68. Willoughby Roofing and Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353, 357-58
(N.D. Ala. 1984), affld. 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
69. Id.
70. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 1386-87.
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Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the punitive damages awarded
by the arbitration panel despite the choice of law provision.
Bonar thus held that investors do not waive their right to punitive
damages against securities brokers where the agreement is ambiguous with
regard to punitive damages. Similar to the arbitration provision at issue
in the Raytheon agreement, the arbitration provision in Bonar authorized
arbitrators to "grant any remedy or relief which [they] deem[ed] just and
equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties."71 The
Raytheon court adopted the Bonar holding and affirmed the lower court's
ruling which refused to vacate the arbitrator's award of punitive damages.
VI. DISTINGUISHING THE CASES
The court in Garrity was concerned that permitting awards of
punitive damages in arbitration would erode confidence in the arbitral
process.73 The Garrity court based its belief on two factors: (1) that
punitive damages would undermine the ongoing contractual relationships
between parties, and (2) that granting such broad and unreviewable power
to arbitrators in the form of punitive damages might make arbitration a
"trap for the unwary. 74
Raytheon is distinguishable from Garrity in that the court in
Raytheon expressly excludes the "ongoing contractual relationship issue"
from its holding. According to Raytheon, such an "ongoing contractual
relationship" exists in labor arbitration disputes. In the typical
commercial dispute, the parties have frequently completed or terminated
their contractual performance prior to arbitration. Raytheon distinguished
such disputes from its holding which applied to a contract that the parties
expected would terminate.
Raytheon is also distinguishable from Blevins. Although both courts
in Raytheon and Blevins looked at the arbitration provisions of the
contract, Blevins concerned a provision for uninsured motorist coverage.
Thus, in Blevins, punitive damages would have no deterrent effect on the
conduct of the defendant insurance company or on the conduct of society
in general. In contrast, the arbitrators in the Raytheon-Automated dispute
may well have believed that punitive damages would have a deterrent
effect in the future.
72. Id. at 1387.
73. Stipanowich. supra note 6, at 1007.
74. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart. Inc.. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
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VII. REASONS FOR PERMITTING ARBITRATORS
TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES
There are advantages to permitting arbitrators to award punitive
damages absent an agreement by the parties to the contrary. Because the
parties have agreed to binding arbitration, a rule prohibiting arbitrators
from awarding punitives may effectively waive the parties' right to seek
punitive damages. The effect would be to limit the use of arbitration.
The unavailability of punitive damages in arbitration may become a
strategic factor for parties choosing between this method of dispute
resolution and formal litigation.
The party denied punitives will most likely be the party in the lower
bargaining position. Punitive damages also punish the culpable party and
deter similar conduct in the future. Moreover, punitive damages also
permit the victim to defray the expenses of arbitration and encourages the
seeking of redress for commercially reprehensible behavior.75
VIII. CONCLUSION
Parties to commercial transactions have increasingly relied upon
arbitration to settle their disputes. This dispute resolution technique
typically arises from a general arbitration clause in the commercial
contract stating that the parties agree to resolve "all disputes" through
arbitration. The question is whether the "all disputes" clause encompasses
punitive damages.
The New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, has held
that punitive damages awarded by arbitrators are per se illegal. The court
in Garrity reasoned that public policy discourages arbitrators from
awarding punitive damages because punitive damages are a social
exemplary remedy, designed to punish the offender much like criminal
law, and therefore can only be imposed by the state. The court also
expressed concern about the lack of judicial oversight of arbitration
awards.
The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that arbitrators could not
award punitive damages absent an express agreement by the parties
granting such authority. In Blevins, the court looked at the specific
arbitration provision of the contract to determine the arbitrators' authority
to award punitive damages. The court concluded that the provision did
not grant such authority. However, the court's holding is limited by the
75. Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 1009-10.
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fact that the dispute involved an insurance contract and a provision for
uninsured motorist coverage.
In the Raytheon-Automated agreement, the contract contained an
"all disputes" clause and Automated sought punitive damages before the
arbitration panel. The arbitration panel awarded punitive damages to
Automated, and Raytheon sued in federal court to vacate the punitive
damages award. The First Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished its
prior decisions in upholding the punitive damages award. The court in
Raytheon relied on the fact that labor arbitration involves a continuing and
ongoing relationship, whereas, the parties to the Raytheon-Automated
agreement terminated their relationship upon completion of performance.
Raytheon is distinguishable from both Garrity and Blevins.
Contrary to the concern in Garrity, the Raytheon dispute did not involve
an ongoing commercial relationship. Because the insurance provision at
issue in Blevins was an uninsured motorist coverage clause, punitive
damages would not deter future conduct of the insurance company.
Raytheon thus serves as the foundation for the authority of
arbitrators to award punitive damages in the future. Because of
advantages such as speed, cost, and expertise of the arbitrators, courts
have increasingly deferred to arbitration. More courts will likely adopt
the Raytheon holding by permitting arbitrators to award punitive damages
in commercial disputes excluding contracts based on a continuing
relationship and absent an agreement to the contrary.
James Hadden
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